

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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MOOTW AND INFORMATION SUPERIORITY: THE IMPORTANCE OF
CONTINUITY AS A PRINCIPLE OF MOOTW IN THE 21ST CENTURY


By

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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8 February 2000

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15. Abstract: MOOTW encompass a wide variety of diverse missions, which are characterized by political sensitivity and less than concrete objectives. A commander may have little control over MOOTW in his theater, yet he is ultimately responsible for the success of any missions occurring there, making coordination of all MOOTW within his theater is a formidable task. The principle of continuity, the idea that all operations, regardless of the extent of a commander's involvement in them, can be planned and coordinated toward defined objectives across the spectrum of MOOTW, is the key to success in MOOTW. Continuity will ensure that MOOTW are coordinated very much the like traditional wartime campaign plan, but with an emphasis on interagency cooperation, sharing of information and intelligence (essential when taken within the context of Joint Vision 2010 and its demand for information superiority), and the current principles of MOOTW. readiness both for increased hostilities and for post-hostility restoration. Focusing on continuity ensures readiness for all contingencies, and enables the commander to better anticipate the transition point to hostilities. In addition, as the difficulties with Operation Just Cause showed in Panama, focusing on continuity will also make planning for those operations easier and, perhaps more importantly, will ensure the proper framework is in place for transition to post-hostilities. This paper analyzes the current principles of MOOTW, drawing on MOOTW over the past two decades and looking to the future of MOOTW and the military's role. It introduces continuity as a proposed addition to the MOOTW principles, explains its particular relevance for the future, examines counter-arguments to its adoption as a principle, and urges for a change which embraces continuity as an essential tenet of joint doctrine.			
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Introduction

The United States faces new threats to its security and interests, and those of its allies, every day. As the sole superpower remaining in a rapidly changing and ever more complex world, it falls upon the United States, as a matter of maintaining that status, to answer the question of how to deal with those threats. In addition, because the United States has adopted a role as world leader, we have taken on new causes outside what might be considered in our direct interest in a traditional sense. Because of our willingness to get involved and due to the current global geopolitical instability, our Armed Forces have been utilized increasingly for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) rather than in a conventional war role. In fact, MOOTW is expected to be the rule rather than the exception for the foreseeable future.

Resident in MOOTW are increased political pressures that, when coupled with extensive media coverage and the ever-widening ability for senior military and political leaders to see more of the theater at all levels, will serve to magnify any miscues by the cognizant commander. The commander will be routinely faced with having to support many operations within his theater, with little control over the organizations running the operations, yet needing to be ready to intervene, potentially with force. If all the agencies and organizations within the theater, with their stove-piped intelligence and functional assets, are not included properly in theater planning, the commander will find the transition to military operations, especially those using force, to be disjointed and chaotic.

Unfortunately, it will be in these types of operations, within the context of a doctrine dominated by a reliance on information superiority and in the "fishbowl environment"¹ of near real-time scrutiny, that the commander will have to plan and operate. Indeed, it is

precisely because of the generally imprecise objectives, timelines, and political and military situations, which characterize MOOTW, that adopting continuity of operations as a principle of MOOTW planning and execution is essential.

This paper analyzes the current principles of MOOTW and introduces a proposed description of continuity as a principle that provides the operational focus the commander needs for MOOTW. Operation *Just Cause*, and especially the aftermath of that military operation in Panama, is presented as an example of how continuity, if embraced by the commander and his planners across all theater agencies involved in MOOTW, can remove many of the unanswered questions and emergent dilemmas facing them, from initial planning through post-hostilities. Additionally, the acute need for continuity is examined within the context of the most probable 21st century situation; that is, MOOTW with military doctrine espousing information dominance as paramount. Finally, possible counter-arguments to adopting continuity as a principle of MOOTW are explored. In the final analysis, however, it should be clear that the importance of continuity outweighs any possible detractors, and that its acceptance as a principle of MOOTW will provide the key to our success across the wide spectrum of MOOTW missions in the future.

The Principles of MOOTW

The current principles of MOOTW, as defined by Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and elaborated upon further by Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, are objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.² The objective should be “clearly defined, decisive, and attainable.” The commander should understand what defines success and what could result in termination of the mission, as well as what could cause failure.³ He is also to ensure that any objectives he

sets contribute to the second principle, unity of effort. Unity of effort, "ensuring all means available are directed to a common purpose,"⁴ is to be sought in every operation, a task made more difficult by any number of non-military and foreign organizations involved. Security, both physical and operational, consists of preventing potential adversaries from taking advantage of our force militarily, politically or with information superiority. This mission will often expand to include the protection of civilians or organizations participating in the endeavor. The commander is reminded of the need to take media coverage into account, especially in matters concerning force security. Restraint is the necessity to use any necessary force judiciously, "balancing the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political objective,"⁵ with the knowledge that excessive force might adversely affect the legitimacy of the operation. The principle of perseverance calls for the commander to ready his forces for a protracted operation if the particular mission requires time to resolve. Specifically, doctrine states that it is important for the commander "to assess possible responses to a crisis in terms of each option's impact on the achievement of the long-term political objective," and that "often the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives, for as long as necessary to achieve them, is a requirement for success."⁶ The last principle of MOOTW, legitimacy, is upheld by the "perception," by a variety of audiences, of the "legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions."⁷ Legitimacy, while dependent upon perception, may be based on numerous factors, although public perception is generally strengthened when humanitarian issues or "obvious national interests"⁸ are involved.

One can see that the Principles of MOOTW are necessarily tailored for a different type of mission than those presented to our forces in time of war. While objective

understandably remains primary to both sets of principles, and security is also common to the principles of war, although perhaps in a broader sense, the other principles reflect a different mission and, subsequently, different approach to that mission. Unity of command is changed to unity of effort in MOOTW simply because attaining unity of command in MOOTW may be extremely difficult or even impossible; non-military or other governmental agencies may be in charge of the response, or may be so intertwined with the operation as to make normal command authority ineffective, leaving mutual cooperation toward a common goal as the obligatory *modus operandi*. The remaining principles of restraint, legitimacy, and perseverance are obviously different from the Principles of War, and they convey necessary concepts for MOOTW.

The principles fall short, however, in that they fail to provide sufficient operational focus to the commander who is tasked with undertaking a MOOTW mission. The range of potential operations in MOOTW is wide and varied and the participants and agendas are many. Joint Pub 3-07 lists fifteen separate missions, ranging from arms control, anti-terrorism and assistance in drug control operations to humanitarian assistance and peace operations, but no doctrine limits itself only to those listed.⁹ For example, the Army's Field Manual for Operations, FM 100-5, lists many of the same missions but further separates peace operations into peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement.¹⁰ All publications examined indicated that MOOTW could certainly take the form of a situation not mentioned. Unfortunately, the fact that the shape of the mission can have so many forms is only the beginning of a commander's difficulties. In a study of eight MOOTW missions undertaken between 1954 and 1994, including U.S. operations in Lebanon, Panama and Somalia and United Nations operations in the Sinai and Cyprus, seven common characteristics of

MOOTW missions were cited: political constraints, restrictive rules of engagement (ROE), urban operations, participation of non-governmental organizations, humanitarian taskings, coalition operations, and the use of special operations forces.¹¹ Each of these characteristics of MOOTW changes the nature of the problem facing the commander in its own way and increases the difficulty of effectively completing the mission. Indeed, when using a military force in dealing with non-combat situations, and combined with the expected characteristics of that mission, listed above, the "boundary [sic] between the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war are blurred."¹² In many cases, smaller forces can have greater strategic impact in MOOTW than they might in a conventional war setting under similar conditions. Media presence and real-time reporting capabilities only serve to magnify the problem. Any planned operation within the theater of operations, regardless of scope, may have significant strategic and political implications that are, perhaps, disproportionate to the scope of the operation. This might serve to handcuff the commander and cause him to shift to a purely reactionary posture, or even to cause paralysis in the extreme case.

As mentioned earlier, the characteristics of MOOTW are such that often "missions are typically poorly defined, difficult and dangerous."¹³ Even before danger enters into the equation, working with numerous non-government organizations (NGOs) and other non-military agencies and groups, with widely varied objectives, within a highly politically constrained framework can present very difficult challenges to obtaining unity of effort.¹⁴ In fact, research attests that "few NGOs are willing to place themselves under military authority, which makes it difficult to coordinate efforts."¹⁵ This problematic pursuit of unity of effort, especially over a long period, also underscores the need for developing an operational plan that not only includes all agencies but also incorporates their individual

capabilities and continuously coordinates their efforts toward common goals. This will allow the operation to go more smoothly and will make theater contingencies or crises easier to handle, should they arise. Pre-existing access to all non-military information assets in theater, for example, will give the commander critical insight early in the crisis.

The principles of war for a conventional setting provide the commander with a more defined sense of the necessity to carefully plan offensive-minded military campaigns designed to take the fight to the enemy and to maintain that initiative. By combining the principles of objective, offensive, mass, maneuver, and surprise the commander has sufficient guidance for effectively focusing his operational art for victory. By scrupulously adhering to these principles, the commander almost cannot help but to maintain operational continuity within his campaign plan. Unfortunately, there is nothing in the MOOTW doctrine that focuses the commander on the need for operational planning across the realm of potential MOOTW challenges in his theater.

The Army's Field Manual for Peace Operations, FM 100-23, does discuss the need for a campaign plan for conducting peace operations, although it does not expound upon its elements. It also warns that transitions from one type of operation to another "may have no clear division between combat and peacetime activities, they may lack definable timetables for transferring responsibilities, and be conducted in a fluid, increasingly political environment."¹⁶ Joint Pub 3-0 also states that MOOTW plans should be "prepared in a similar manner as plans for war," and that "commanders should always plan to have the right mix of forces available to quickly transition to combat operations or evacuate."¹⁷

Unfortunately, the use of operational art in the MOOTW realm is not clarified further, except perhaps in the realm of Crisis Action Planning (CAP), although in that case the planning is

also normally for a specific use of force. The process for translating the principles of MOOTW into a campaign plan not explicitly designed for combat is not clear either, but a focus on continuity will provide the answer.

The Need for Continuity

The Oxford Dictionary lists four meanings for "continue": (1) maintain; not stop; (2) resume or prolong (a narrative, journey, etc.); (3) be a sequel; and (4) remain. "Continuity" is defined as the state of being continuous (unbroken or uninterrupted) or, simply, logical sequence. Michael Handel, in his discussion of continuity in both an operational and strategic sense, holds that the principle of continuity "states that commanders must exploit an advantage by keeping the enemy under unrelenting pressure, thereby denying him the respite or time to regain his equilibrium."¹⁸ Of course, "unrelenting pressure" may not always be the most appropriate motto for MOOTW, especially those far from combat operations, but it does support the frame of mind necessary for continuously focusing assets in preparation for future need. As the theater heats up, however, Handel's definition quickly becomes more relevant. Handel goes on to state "the principle of continuity can be applied to the strategic and policy levels as well as to the lower levels of military operations."¹⁹ This makes it especially appropriate to MOOTW, where even small units or minor operations can have significant political and strategic ramifications. The reality that the plan will typically have to include extended timelines, embrace civilian organizations and other agencies (along with their particular agendas), and allow the employment of force only as a last resort,²⁰ if at all, once again underscores the need for continuity. Focusing on maintaining continuity in MOOTW operations, regardless of the scope, is essential. Unfortunately, the related principles of MOOTW, unity of effort and perseverance, do not provide the commander with

that focus.

Unity of effort is emphasized in joint MOOTW doctrine because there will probably be no unity of command. If that unity is continuously and conscientiously sought at all levels, by all organizations for all operations, the commander's ability to focus all operations in the theater will be greatly enhanced. However, it is only by employing the principle of continuity that unity of effort can be maintained across the vast continuum of possible MOOTW situations.

Perseverance, even when combined with a good objective and unity of effort, does not instill within the commander any sense of urgency, especially in a situation where the threat of armed conflict may not be looming large. In fact, to "prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims"²¹ leaves much to the imagination and does not adequately push for an aggressive approach to the problem. FM 100-23, in its discussion of peace operations, reiterates that the "underlying causes of confrontation and conflict rarely have a clear beginning or a decisive resolution,"²² but it does not expound upon the inherent need for campaign-type planning to offset that uncertainty. It is only when things begin to heat up, when the beginnings of a crisis are perceived, or when the military forces in theater formally shift from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, for example, that continuity of operations is directed, *de facto*, in the form of a campaign plan.

That perseverance is essential is clear, especially for operations such as counterdrug operations, nation assistance, and some humanitarian assistance cases, which can last for extended periods of time and where specific goals can be hard to define. With the enhanced political sensitivity toward MOOTW, and the need to prevent hostilities as a potential

primary goal, all levels of the command are infused with the need for restraint in action. Increased political sensitivity leads to more restrictive ROE in an attempt to prevent a mission-ending incident, and more restrictive ROE, in turn, serve further to drive home the need for restraint by the forces until any action at all can be difficult. A mindset of perseverance, in conjunction with the emphasis on restraint, but without a focus on progressive campaign planning for all operations in theater, before, during and after military operations utilizing force, may drive the force more toward a long-term *status quo* rather than toward success in the mission. This is especially important because the dividing line between the MOOTW operation and a shooting war may not be clear or easily predicted. Reliance only on the doctrinal principles of MOOTW may lead to the failure to foresee that transition,²³ perhaps disastrously.

Continuity and Campaign Planning in MOOTW

Because campaigns today are visualized solely as a means to sequence and synchronize military operations that are expected to involve at least some level of combat,²⁴ the need for developing a cogent, continuity-minded campaign plan is not usually deemed necessary unless the use of military force is envisioned. Joint doctrine defines a campaign as a "series of major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic operational objectives."²⁵ Milan Vego describes campaigns as the "only method of combat force employment aimed to accomplish national-strategic or theater-strategic military objectives."²⁶ And while both the Joint Pubs and Vego acknowledge that campaigns can exist in MOOTW,²⁷ there is no emphasis placed on ensuring that the mindset required for planning a good campaign is present in MOOTW. The essence of an effective campaign plan lies in the ability of the commander to coordinate and synchronize all the

forces at his disposal in a logical, sequenced, sustained, and overpowering manner. This is impossible to achieve without dedicated focus on the principle of continuity—if not explicitly stated as a planning goal, it is certainly implicit in the way that successful plans evolve.

The principle of continuity in war, and especially in MOOTW, serves to remind the commander of the importance of a good plan that takes and keeps the initiative and maintains operational tempo. It is also the glue that binds together the myriad of elements in that plan. The development of a campaign plan, which covers all aspects and participants in an operation, will embrace continuity and will make the transitions from peace to conflict to post-conflict smoother and more manageable. Obviously, it will be extremely difficult, or impossible, to produce an effective campaign plan that includes all potential military missions within a MOOTW operation before the need for such a mission becomes clear. However, a well-designed MOOTW campaign plan at the start of the operation, which incorporates a number of varied scenarios and planned responses, will be instrumental to smooth operations. It will enhance preparedness for normal, expected operations as well as increase the ability to smoothly handle contingencies and crises, should they occur. In the least, it will assist the commander and the cognizant agencies with coordination and familiarity, with the theater and each other. This will accelerate the development of the theater and, in turn, will facilitate the addition of a combat mission into the theater, if required, whether or not the mission was planned or even foreseen in the initial campaign plan.

A good illustration of this concept may be seen in the case of Operation *Just Cause*, the U.S. operation in Panama to overthrow the dictatorship of Manuel Noriega in December

1989. Panama was a mature MOOTW theater if ever one existed. The U.S. military had been involved in Panama since 1903 and there were a number of other agencies and tens of thousands of U.S. civilians operating and living in Panama.²⁸ Because of U.S. concern for the security of the Panama Canal and American citizens in Panama, Noriega's alleged involvement in corrupt activities, brutality and drug trafficking attracted an inordinate amount of high-level U.S. attention as early as late 1985.²⁹ In 1987, various plans for potential military operations in Panama were discussed. It was not until the summer of 1989, however, that the actual plans used for *Just Cause* were developed, essentially starting "from scratch,"³⁰ as a result of a failed coup attempt, and our failure to correctly predict the reaction of key Panamanian elements, including the Panama Defense Forces (PDF).

That the plan eventually led to a successful operation is not disputed, but the need to re-start planning, the inaccuracy of the available intelligence, and especially the difficult transition to post-hostilities might have been negated by better use of all theater assets prior to the declared crisis. The circumstances for the operation in Panama heavily favored the United States: Noriega was disliked in Panama and the U.S. troops were welcomed as liberators; the PDF were not equal to the military task of defeating the invasion; and the United States was already well-established in Panama and knew it well.³¹ In addition, because the United States conducted *Just Cause* as a unilateral military operation, thereby removing coalition coordination concerns, it was operationally easier from the start. In short, the stage should have been set for the U.S. to succeed, yet we had to go back to the drawing board and start over just before we needed to commit our military, because we were surprised when we arguably did not need to be. (Obviously, we did not know that we would be executing the plan as early as December, but that simply changed the urgency of the

planning.)

Even a MOOTW campaign plan that did not include the specific employment of additional troops for combat in Panama should have produced a situation where Operation *Just Cause* could have been planned and conducted more easily. Certainly, a focus on operational continuity within the theater prior to hostilities would have provided for a more comprehensive approach to the post-hostilities phase of the operation, where the deficiency in planning was most obvious. Interagency cooperation was necessary but not present. As Schultz notes, the ability to effectively plan “entailed a knowledge of the history, politics, and cultural context of Panama, as well as an understanding of the dynamics of democratization and nation-building. This combination was beyond the capabilities of ... any part of the military.”³² It should be clear that a commander, with a campaign plan stressing continuity of operations among all the organizations involved, will have a clearer picture of all the theater elements and the effect they will have on potential military operations, even before the operations are actually planned.

An effective MOOTW campaign plan will undoubtedly need to be complex, especially in a theater where numerous organizations have missions, tensions are high, and politics reign supreme. This fact should be an argument for a mindset of continuity within the theater, because focusing on continuity will be the key to maintaining control of the theater in MOOTW. This focus will be more difficult, yet no less important, for the commander who does not enjoy full control over MOOTW in his area of operations. Stove-piped command structures increase coordination difficulties across the spectrum of issues involved in an area, and intelligence held by one organization is not necessarily known by, or shared with, another. Although intelligence, or lack of it, is not the only function making

MOOTW problematic for the military commander, it permeates all operations and is heavily relied upon. The importance of intelligence and information superiority for the future, and the essential role that continuity will play in keeping the commander on track, is such that it demands specific mention.

Information Superiority and Continuity

Continuity within MOOTW will become all the more indispensable in the future as information superiority becomes the foundation upon which Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010) will be built in its quest for "Full Spectrum Dominance."³³ JV2010 states that we "must have information superiority: the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same."³⁴ Obviously, the impact on leaders and warfare (including MOOTW) of new systems, technology and doctrine associated with achieving information superiority or Network Centric Warfare, if indeed that is the course we follow, is unforeseen. A comprehensive analysis of the psychology involved with decision making is beyond the scope of this paper, but a discussion of the effects of information on decision making within the context of the peculiarities of MOOTW, as compared to war, produces a good argument for focusing the commander on operational continuity.

"There is still another factor that can bring military action to a standstill: imperfect knowledge of the situation."³⁵ The situation that Clausewitz is writing about is conventional war, of course, but he is also describing human nature. It is normal for a commander's confidence in his decisions to grow as he becomes more familiar with the decision making process and his situation;³⁶ however, the inverse tends to be true as well.

Incomplete information can potentially cause paralysis because of the uncertainty

brought about by the lack of information. This could be because the information is just not there or, perhaps more likely, because the commander does not feel he has the right information, in the right quantity, to act. As Handel astutely notes, "uncertainty (i.e. poor intelligence) and human nature combine to create further inaction."³⁷

Conversely, a potential negative effect of information superiority is the presence of too much information, creating a possible "information overload" situation. This can also lead to terminal indecision, but it can also serve to "blind" the commander, who might not realize he is suffering from information overload.³⁸ Yet another peril of having too much information available is that if a preponderance of data is available on a certain issue, decisions may be made or rationalized based purely on the "sheer weight of information" on that topic³⁹ rather than being focused on more pertinent criteria.

Of course, all of the difficulties stemming from either a scarcity or a surplus of information are not unique to war or even a specific time period, and they are certainly not unique to MOOTW. However, the irregular characteristics of MOOTW, especially for a military force that is trained for war instead of MOOTW, accentuate the difficulties experienced with the quest for information superiority. In the future, it is quite possible that the same information that the commander uses to make decisions in his theater will be available to his boss, or perhaps even at the National Command Authority level. How much extra guidance will be forthcoming in this scenario? This is an age-old debate that is not necessarily founded on anything but dread, on the commander's part, of micro-management from above. However, once global media coverage is added to a mission that is already politically highly charged or has not been defined well, any number of NGOs and other agencies get involved, and force security becomes a major public support concern, the

consequence of even a small miscue takes on a whole new dimension. The only way that the commander can be sure he has all the information that he needs to act confidently is by active, continuous interagency involvement across the spectrum of operations in his theater. Thus, the requirement for information dominance, given the difficulties of obtaining that information in MOOTW, will make his focus on continuity even more necessary.

Is Continuity Really Needed as a Principle of MOOTW (or War)?

As one would expect, it is more critical for certain missions in MOOTW to adhere to all its principles and to focus on maintaining continuity than it is for others. These missions, not surprisingly, are those where the potential for violence and the use of force is ever present or likely. While disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in peaceful environments are relatively benign, insurgency and counter-insurgency support, counter-drug operations and anti-terrorism are examples of missions requiring a plan and continuity. Among the best examples, however are peace keeping and peace enforcement. The main difficulties lie not in the actual operations themselves, although no operation could ever be classified as "easy," but rather in its political (and physical) environment and the level of its threat potential that typify these MOOTW missions.⁴⁰ It is to the Army's credit that FM 100-23 calls for a campaign plan, but the emphasis on continuity across the spectrum of operations and agencies, from beginning to end, remains absent.

The National Military Strategy of the United States of America states that "the primary purpose of US Armed Forces is to deter threats of organized violence against the United States and its interests, and to defeat such threats should deterrence fail."⁴¹ Likewise, JV2010, which was developed to provide a conceptual basis for the U.S. Armed Forces of the next generation, focuses on the absolute requirement for fighting and winning the nation's

wars if deterrence should fail. However, it also adds that, "in addition, we should expect to participate in a broad range of deterrent, conflict prevention, and peacetime activities."⁴² By enunciating the expectation that the United States will increasingly find itself a participant, willing or not, in MOOTW, JV2010 has simply acknowledged a fundamental change in the way our forces have been deployed since the end of the cold war. During this period, U.S. forces have been involved, essentially continuously, in MOOTW operations from one end of the defined MOOTW spectrum to the other. The arguments over required force structures, training, and military equipment required by each branch of our armed forces seem based not so much on whether MOOTW operations will dominate the future, but rather on how much emphasis should be placed on those operations, perhaps to the detriment of conventional war-fighting capabilities.⁴³ Unfortunately, the "how" is only a fraction of the problem. The questions of who the opponent will be, what form he will take, and in what context we will be forced to confront him make the solution tremendously more difficult to uncover. Stressing continuity as a principle of MOOTW will ensure these questions are answered before CAP is required and our response is one of pure reaction instead of planned response.

Admittedly, there are arguments against accepting continuity as a principle of MOOTW. As stated previously, continuity as a principle of war may be superfluous given the combined effects of adhering to the rest of the principles of war. By thinking offensively, maintaining the initiative, concentrating combat power, and using surprise to his advantage, while keeping the objective in focus, the commander will almost automatically maintain continuity of operations. This is particularly true because he will probably be concerned almost entirely about purely military considerations, which will serve to focus his efforts even further. Although necessary in warfare, continuity as a principle of MOOTW, as

argued, is even more imperative because the commander may not have complete control over MOOTW operations in his theater, and he will probably not be focused on maintaining continuity like it would in war. When involved in combat operations inside MOOTW, neither the commander, nor even his field commanders (and troops for that matter), will have the luxury of focusing entirely on the military aspects of their mission. There is an argument that if campaign planning is taken on and performed consistently for MOOTW, the principle of continuity will be ensured.⁴⁴ This may be so, and perhaps the use of continuity in operations will become sufficiently ingrained in our minds as to make stating a need for it superfluous, especially if campaign planning in MOOTW gains greater doctrinal emphasis. However, does that make the concept so basic and inherent to the planning process that it “goes without saying?”⁴⁵

Another argument, along the same lines, might be that the need for continuity is so obvious as to be “common sense,” that the commander will always know to stress continuity of operations, regardless of the mission. This might be the case if the commander were trained on its necessity or if joint MOOTW doctrine bound him to its application, which is not the case. Using the same logic, a like argument might be made that any of the principles of MOOTW could be viewed as common sense to a given commander. And, if this is the case, is not the whole purpose for having principles obviated by a faith in the commander’s keen insight, whether it is founded or not?

Lastly, perhaps a case can be made against using continuity as a principle of war on the grounds of maintaining simplicity; keeping the number of principles to a minimum. Indeed, there is certainly a great deal to be said of simplicity, especially in war. From the infancy of a plan to its ultimate execution, the fewer “moving parts” it contains, the better

chance it has of coming off as envisioned. Adding one more principle for the commander and his planners to take into account might only increase the amount of "stuff" to remember, without added benefit. However, because of the manner in which the concept of continuity needs to permeate both the planning and execution phases of any operation, including MOOTW, embracing this particular principle really does augment the commander's tool bag in a positive way rather than just adding one more term for the planners to handle.

Conclusion

JV2010 stresses the importance of joint doctrine: "As we change the way we fight, joint doctrine will remain the foundation that fundamentally shapes the way we think about and train for military operations. Joint doctrine is a critical ingredient for success because the way in which leaders think and organize their forces will be as important as the technology we use to conduct future joint operations."⁴⁶ Given the emphasis we are placing on the way our leaders will think and act in the 21st century, especially with regard to the joint doctrine that will be the foundation for those actions, it is more important than ever to adopt continuity of operations as a principle of MOOTW.

MOOTW is the U.S military's challenge for the future, and a focus on continuity across its increasingly broad and diverse spectrum, especially within the context of information superiority and its demands, is fundamental to our success. The ability to predict and handle the oftentimes rapid transitions from peaceful operations to use of force within MOOTW is absolutely critical to saving American lives and achieving our goals, especially if short-term military operations are required. The commander, whose leadership role, as highlighted in JV2010, will become even more central to any operations in the future, and the

principle of continuity should be the commander's key focus in making MOOTW viable for the United States' military.

Recommendations

The principle of continuity, and specifically continuity of operations, should be adopted as a principle of joint MOOTW for the 21st century. At a minimum, should its incorporation as a principle of MOOTW be deemed unnecessary, continuity of operations must be embraced as an integral part of MOOTW planning doctrine. Regardless of whether or not the commander has direct cognizance over a particular operation in his theater, he will still be held at least partially accountable for its success. It is therefore imperative for him to remain focused on effectively coordinating the increasingly more diverse, complex, and ever-expanding continuum of MOOTW in his area of operations. Continuity is the only principle that will provide that focus.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: DoD C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, 1999), 226.
- ² Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Joint Pub 3-0)(Washington, D.C.: February 1, 1995), V-2.
- ³ Ibid.
- ⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (Joint Pub 3-07)(Washington, D.C.: June 16, 1995), II-3.
- ⁵ Ibid., II-4.
- ⁶ Ibid., 4-5.
- ⁷ Ibid., 5.
- ⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹ Ibid., III-1.
- ¹⁰ Army Department. Operations (FM 100-5)(Washington, D.C.: June 1993), 13-0.
- ¹¹ James R. Ayers, Military Operations Other Than War in the New World Order: An Analysis of Joint Doctrine for the Coming Era (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology Air University, 1996), 27-29.
- ¹² Gregory J. Borden, Operational Decision to Execution Gaps in Operations Other Than War: Ceding the Information Initiative, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies, 1995), 29.
- ¹³ Operations Other Than War (OOTW): The Technological Dimension (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995), 16.
- ¹⁴ Thomas S. James, Jr., Campaign Planning: An Effective Concept for Military Operations Other Than War, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies, 1997), 17.
- ¹⁵ Ayers, 32-33.
- ¹⁶ Army Department. Peace Operations (FM 100-23)(Washington, D.C.: June 1993), 31-33.
- ¹⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint Pub 3-0), IV-1.
- ¹⁸ Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, (London: Cass, 1996), 99.
- ¹⁹ Ibid., 102.
- ²⁰ James, 48.
- ²¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint Pub 3-0), V-3.
- ²² Army Department (FM 100-23), 17-18.
- ²³ Jeffrey L. Spara, Peacekeeping and FM 100-5: Do They Match? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies, 1994), 44.
- ²⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint Pub 3-0), III-4-9; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations (Joint Pub 5-0)(Washington, D.C.: April 13, 1995), II-18-21. Interestingly, Joint Pubs 3-0 and 5-0 discuss the campaign without specifically saying that campaign planning is for use of force only, however the "operations" that are described as applicable for this planning are obviously those requiring military force.
- ²⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint Pub 3-0), III-4.
- ²⁶ Vego, Milan, On Operational Art, 4th ed. (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 1999), 187.
- ²⁷ Ibid., 188. Campaigns in low-intensity conflicts are differentiated from war campaigns by the fact that the operations will normally be more minor but in support of more strategic objectives.
- ²⁸ Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Ross and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama, (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 3-24.
- ²⁹ Ibid., 10.
- ³⁰ Ibid., 57.
- ³¹ Ibid., 401.
- ³² Robert H. Schultz, Jr., In the Aftermath of War, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL: Air University Press, 1993), 21.
- ³³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), 26.
- ³⁴ Ibid., 16.

³⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (Ed. and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret)(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 84.

³⁶ Stacy M. Clements, The One with the Most Information Wins? The Quest for Information Superiority. (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology Air University, 1997), 53.

³⁷ Handel, 109.

³⁸ Clements, 66-82.

³⁹ Ibid., 66.

⁴⁰ James, 18.

⁴¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy for the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: September 1997), 5.

⁴² Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010, 4.

⁴³ Ayers, 3-4.

⁴⁴ James, 47.

⁴⁵ Frost, Robert S., The Growing Imperative to Adopt "Flexibility" as an American Principle of War (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), 24.

⁴⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010, 29.

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